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3. Ire assignment, surrender, &c., of leases, and other interests
under the Statute of -Frauds.
As to the surrender, or assignment of parol leases less than three
years, see Browne on Statute of Frauds, § 46, where it is said that
with the exception of Connecticut, perhaps, Pennsylvania stands
alone in denying the English rule which holds such parol assign-
ment invalid. As to the English law see the cases cited in .eKin-
.ney v. Reader, 7 Watts 123, and see Former v. Bogers, 2 Wils. 26 ;
Beek v. Phillips, 5 Burr. 2827; Baxter v. Browne, 2 Blackst. 973;
aoodtitle v. Way, 1 Term Rep. 735; _Poule v. Bentley, 12 East
167; Morgan v. Bissell, 3 Taunt. 5. See as to the Pennsylvania
rule, Greider's Appeal, 5 Penna. St. 422; Kine's Appeal, 39 Id.
468; Adams v. McKesson, 53 Id. 83. In MeKinney v. Reader, 7
Watts 123, the leading case, Tate v. Reynolds, 8 W. & S. 91,
Shootstallv. Adams, 2 Grant 209, it was held that, inasmuch as leases
for less than three years were expressly excepted from the statute
as to their 6reation, there was no reason for holding that as to their
transfer the statute applied, and that therefore the assignment, or
surrender of such leases, was good by parol; and that equitable
estates though they could be created by parol (the seventh and eighth
sections of 29 Car. II. not being in force) cannot under the first
section be so transferred: .Hurphy v.-Hbuert, 7 Penna. St. 423;
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see Sm. Lead. Cases (Am. ed.), p. *184; see Briles v. Pace, 13
Ired. 279, as favoring the Pennsylvania rule, except as to mining
leases, which are specially provided for by statute: see also Holli-
day v. Marshal, 7 Johns. 211. "It is true," said the court in
.Kline's Appeal, 39 Penna. St. 468, supra, "that equitable interests
in land are within the Statute of Frauds and are not assignable
except by writing, but they may be waived by parol, so as to put
it out of the power of the holder to obtain the interposition of a
chancellor on his behalf, or they may be released: Boyce v. MCul-
lough, 3 W. & S. 429: -Dayton v. Newman, 19 Penna. St. 194."
See also Skoopstall v. Adams, supra; Lefevre v. Lefevre, 4 S.
& R. 241; Espy v. Anderson, 14 Penna. St. 308; Cravener v.
Bowser, 4 Id. 259; Bowser v. Cravener, 56 Id. 132; Benshaw v.
Gans, 7 Id. 118; Goucher v. Martin, 9 Watts 106. See, as to
how far a parol waiver of rights under a writing required by ihe
Statute of Frauds is good, and as supporting Boyce v. McCullough,
supra, Tfentz v. Defaven, 1 S. & R. 817; Raffensberger v. Cul-
lison, 28 Penna. St. 426 ; Lauer v. Lee, 42 Id. 170 ; Jackson v.
Litch, 62 Id. 451. See upon the general subject of the discharge
of written contracts by parol, the English cases cited in Cummings
v. Arnold, 3 Metc. 486.
4. Written authority to an agent to contract for the sale of land.
In Parrish v. Koons, 1 Pars. Eq- 79, another departure from the
English law was taken because of the omission of the fourth and
seventeenth sections of 29 Car. II., and the English rule that while
an agent to convey must be authorized in writing, an agent to
contract need not be, was denied; the fourth and seventeenth sec-
tions requiring agents to be "lawfully authorized" being not in
force in Pennsylvania, and in the third section which is in force,
the words being "agents lawfully authorized by writing :" the court
held that a written authority was necessary when the action was
not for damages, but for the specific performance of a contract of
sale of land effected by an agent. See this case for discussion of
the English cases: and also, for the citation of Pennsylvania cases
requiring a writing in the case of a vendor's agent and the argument
that the rule should be the same in the case of the vendee.
5. The application of the equitable doctrine of mutuality of
remedy to questions arising under the Statute of Fraud.
Premising that in view of the fact that the fourth section of 29
Car. II., c. 3, provided that the memorandum is to be signed by
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 643
the party to be charged, it has been held in England that the party
so signing is bound, though the other party not signing might not
be bound; and that as against the party signing the contract would
be enforced notwithstanding the doctrine of mutuality of remedy
which holds that equity will not interfere to enforce a contract
'against a defendant when for any reason the defendant could not
have the'contract enforced as against the plaintiff, we come to the
case of WF7aon v. Clarke, 1 W. & S. 555, in which, owing to the
absence from the Pennsylvania act of the fourth section of 29 Car.
II., c. 3, it is contended that 'no exception to the ordinary rule of
mutuality is to be made in cases arising under the Statute of Frauds.
This case is an interesting one, but the vigorous opinion of that
eminent lawyer, Chief Justice Gi3soN is, as he admits, dictum, inas-
much as there was in the case no memorandum signed by any one,
and, therefore the Statute of Frauds applied irrespective of the
question of mutuality. Judge GiBSON, while holding that he was
not bound by the English decisions, owing to the fourth section not
being in force, yet thought that at any rate tlese decisions were
mistaken, citing Lord REDESDALE and Chancellor Kmr as following
them reluctantly. In Parrish v. Koons, I Pars. E q. Cas., Judge
Kn G converted the dictum of GIBsoN into decision, and held where
the plaintiff, the owner* of land, having signed a memorandum,
agreeing to sell it and delivered the memorandum to the defendant,
sued for the purchase-money, that he could not recover, inasmuch
as the defendant had not signed; Lowry v. Mehaffy, infra, was
distinguished as being a base of- part-performance. In Meason v.'
Kaine, 67 Penna. St. 131, Judge AGNEW seemed to think that the
doctrine of Wilson v. Clarke was law in Pennsylvania.
Before considering Tipp v. Bishop, infra, which. expressly rules
the contrary, we may take up some early cases, which with the
exception of Lowry v. il-ehaffy, remarked upon by Judge KING,
have, not been noticed in the discussion. In Lowry v. lehaffy, 10
Watts 387, decided the year before Wilson v. Clarke, a plaintiff, the
owner of land- having signed a memorandum sufficient within the
Statute of Frauds to bind him to convey the land, sued for the
purchase-money; it was held that the memorandum was sufficient
and that he could recover, and that the fourth section not being in
force made the case all the stronger in his favor; it is true that
there was part-performance in this case but the decision was rested
on the sufficiency of the memorandum. In Colt v. eldon, -5 Watts
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528, the action was ejectment by a vendor against a vendee in pos-
session and a memorandum, signed by the vendee agreeing to take
the land and delivercd to the vendor, seems to have been regarded
as a sufficient memorandum under the Statute of Frauds, and judg-
ment was given for the defendant. Here it will be seen that a
vendee in possession of land could defend his title under a contract
of sale by proof of a memorandum signed by himself alone (query,
whether this case has any other sound basis than that of part-per-
formance). In lifearson's Appeal, 11 Penna. St. 510, where a
son sued the administrators of his father for specific performance
of a contract made by the father to convey certain land to him and
gave in evidence an unsealed writing, reciting the promise and the
consideration thereof received from the son, which writing was
signed by the father but not by the son, it was held that this was a
sufficient compliance with the statute, and specific performance was
decreed, English cases being cited. In Fan Horne v. Pricke, 6
S. & R. 92, semble, that in a parol sale of land the vendor would
be bound by a receipt given by him for the purchase-money. In
Trip v. Bishop, 56 Penna. St. 426, said STRONG, J., "If a contract
is not within the Statute of Frauds, or if the contracting parties
have done all that the statutes requires, there is no reason why a
purchaser should not be held to pay what he promised ;" that under
the Pennsylvania act, the vendor only need sign: Lowry v.
2hehaffy, supra, being relied on, and Wilson v. Clarke, supra,
being distinguished as a case where the vendor did not sign; that
where the vendor has signed, the contract becomes mutually obliga-
tory and nothing remains but to pay the purchase-money, and the
promise to do that need not be in writing. See also Johnston v.
Cowan, 59 Penna. St. 275, following Lowry v. lfehaffy to the effect
that one party only need sign. It will be found, we think, that in
all cases of guaranty arising since the Act of 22d April 1856, the
sufficiency of a memorandum signed by the defendant only has been
assumed. See as to Wilson v. Clarke, and the doctrine of mutu-
ality, Browne on Statute of Frauds, § 866.
6. Part performance by possession taken.
In Allen's Estate, 1 W. & S. 386, it was said by Judge KEN-
NEDY, that the doctrine that possession taken is sufficient part-per-
formance of a parol contract relating to land, to take the case out
of the Statute of Frauds, was adopted to prevent the vendee being
sued as atrespasser; and that upon this ground principally, if not
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solely, the English position was taken. Now, said the learned
judge, this reason does not exist in Pennsylvania for adopting the
English rule, because in the first place, the fourth section not being
in force, and the first three, which are, providing that a parol con-
veyance shall pass an estate at will, the tenant at will could not be
treated as a trespasser; and secondly, because, under the peculiar
Pennsylvania rule (supra) such a vendee upon a vendor's refusing
to properly convey could re-deliver possession and not only not be
held as a trespasser, but could himself hold the vendor in damages.
In Pugh v. Good, 3 W. & S. 57, it was said that the English
decisions as to part-performance had been followed in Pennsylvania
notwithstanding the omission of the fourth section, several earlier
cases being cited, and Todd v. Pfoutz, 8 Yeates 179, being distin-
guished (see also Reed v. Reed, 12 Penna. St. 120; Farley v.
Stokes, 1 Pars. Eq. 429) ; in Pugh v. Good, it was urged by coun-
sel that inasmuch as owing to the omission of the fourth section
compensation for part-performance could be obtained in an action
of damages, there was less reason to decree specific execution ;' to
this GIBSON, C. J. (though he had admitted in Parker v. Wells, 6
Whart. 162 that this was a good argument in favor of greater strict-
ness in allowing part-performance to take a case out of the stathte)
answered, first, that compensation as such could be as easily obtained
in England in equity, notwithstanding the fourth section of the
Statute of Frauds, as here, and -therefore that the assumption that
compensation could not be obtained, could. not have been the reason.why specific execution in cases of part-performance was allowed, and
secondly, that the only opposition made to such specific execution
was based upon the fourth section, and that therefore where the
fourth section is not in force there is less reason to resist, specific
execution; as to Pugh v. Good, see Browne on Statute of Frauds,
§ 467.
The doctrine that possession taken of land contracted by parol to
be sold will of itself remove the bar of the Statute of Frauds has
been carrieil further probably in Pennsylvania than in most of the
other United: States or even than in England: Reed v. Reed, 12
Penna. St. "117; Ackerman v. _Piher, 57 Id. 457; Jfood v.
I See McKowen r. McDonald, 43 Penna. St. 441, where specific performance
was refused, it being stated that would be a sufficient compensation in damages for
any part-performance that might have been made.
STUDIES IN TIE LAW OF
Piarmar, 10 Watts 195; ParriLsh v. Koons, 1 Pars. Eq. 89;
Gilday v. Watson, 2 S. & R. 407; Pfeifer v. Landis, 1 Watts
392; .3IJcarland v. Hall, 3 Watts 37 ; Christy v. Barnhart, 14
Penna. St. 260; Pollmer v. Dale, 9 Id. 83; Reynolds v. Hewett,
27 Penna. St. 176; Sage v. .McGuire, 4 W. & S. 228; Bil-
lington v. Welch, 5 Binn. 129; Alross v. Culver, 64 Penna. St.
424; .2oore v. Small, 19 Id. 461. These cases seem to go
the length of holding that notoriety of possession is a sufficient
substitute for the memorandum required by the statute.
But in Farley v. Stokes, supra, Juidge KING, citing .Pugh v.
Good, supra, and saying that Chief Justice GIBSON asserts the
doctrine which Sir THOM!AS PLUMER seemed to have ruled (3lorplhett
v. Jones, 1 Swanst. 172), viz., that delivery of possession alone is
sufficient part-performance, added, "of course whether delivery of
possession be an unequivocal act of part-performance must depend
on the circumstances of the particular transaction." In Bassler v.
.Niesly, 2 S. & R. 352, TILGHMAN, C. J., said that possession alone
would not always take a case out of the Statute of Frauds, but with
others,-as payment of the purchase-money, was a strong circum-
stance. In W1rorkman v. Gutlrie, 29 Penna. St. 495, Judge WOOD-
WARD said, "whilst possession in pursuance of -a parol contract
is not of itself such part-performance as necessarily to take it out
of the statute, &c." In Van Loon v. Davenport, 1 Weekly Notes
(Phila.) (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania) 320, in a case where the
purchase-money was paid and possession taken but no valuable im-
provements made, no part-performance was held to be made out;
the terms of the contract, it is to be remarked, were not perfectly
clear.
7. Trusts.
In Wither's Appeal,. 14 S. & R. 185, there was a dictum of
Judge DUNCAN'S to the effect that the omission in Pennsylvania of
the seventh and eighth sections of 29 Car. II. was of no consequence,
as by implication parol express trusts were prohibited by the first
section, on the ground that as an express trust is an interest or
estate in land, it cannot under the first section be created by parol.
This dictum was overruled in Murphy v. Hubert, 7 Penna. St. 423,
GIBSON, C. J., saying, that the only authorities to the effect that
parol express trusts are not valid in Pennsylvania, are mere dicta;
that the omission of the seventh and eighth sections was conclusive
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on the point, the transcriber of the Pennsylvania statute having
done his work in a masterly manner; that the arguments against
parol express trusts will prove too much, and parol implied trusts
would also have to be held invalid, inasmuch as the proviso in
their favor is in the eighth section which is not in force (query,
however, whether this proviso is not merely declaratory of the com-
mon law*: Hoxie v. Carr, 1 Sumn. C. C. 173; Browne on Stat.
of Frauds, § 84) ; and that misconceptions would arise if English
decisions based on a different statute were too closely followed.
reeman v. Freeman, 2 Pars. Eq. 85, following Alurphy v. Hubert,
cites a large number of cases on the subject, and shows that
many of the cases cited as denying parol express trusts were de-
cided on the ground, not that the evidence was in parol, but
because it was generally insufficient to establish a trust: see cases
cited in Freeman v. Freeman, and see also Randall v. Silverthorne,
4 Penna. St. 173; Swartz v. Swarti, Id. 353; WJetherel v. Barn-
2ilton, 15 Id. 198 ; Lloyd v. Carter, 17 Id. 220;. Morey v. Herrick,
18 Id. 128 ; Tritt v. Croker, 18 Id. 455. The Pennsylvania rul-
ing prior to 1856 was the same as that of North Carolina: -TOy V.
Foy, 2 ilayw. 296; Shelton v. Shelton, 5 Jones Eq. 296;. Oloott
v. Bynum, 17 Wall. 44, Of Virginia: Bank of United- States v.
Carrington, 7 Leigh 566; Walraver v. Locke, 2 P. & H. 547.
Of Texas: James v. Fulcrod (citing as to the common law before
the Statute of Frauds, Toy v;. Foy, supra, 4 Kent 805, Wils. on
Trust 46, 2 Story Eq., § 372; 2 Fonbl. Eq., Br. 2, ch. 2, sect. 4,
n. 6), BaTey v. Harris, 19 Tei. 108; Miller v. Thatcher, 9 Id.
482. And in -Mississippi, prior to the revised code, Arding v.
.Davis, 88 Miss. 574 ; see Browne on Stat. of Frauds, § 81, as- to
the Pennsylvania cases prior to 1856. In Williard v. Williard, 56
Penna. St. .124, cases being numerously cited, it was said that prior
to April 22d 1856, parol express trusts were good, and that the
fourth section of that act was substantially the same as the seventh
and eighth sections of 29 Car. II., c. 3.
Since April 22d 1856, express trusts cannot be proved by parol:
Barnet v. Jiougherty, 82 Penna. St. 371. In Mehson v. Kaine, 63
Penna. St. 839, Judge SHARSWOOD said that the Murphy v. Hrubert
line of cases had, he believed, always met with the dissatisfaction of
the profession, till the Act of 1856 did away with the effect of them.
In Church v. Ruland, 64 Penna. St. 442, it was held, citing Eng-
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lish and Pennsylvania cases, that trusts ex maleficio are not within
the Act of 1856.
By the 6th section of the Act of 22d April 1856, see above,
trusts excepted from the provisions of the statute must be asserted
within a certain time. In Clarke v. Trindle, 52 Penna. St. 495,
said Tio.MPSON, C. J., speaking of the section, "It will (when
the verbiage, &c., is taken out) read ' That no right of entry shall
accrue or action be maintained * * * to enforce any implied or
resulting trust as to realty but within five years after * * * such
equity or trust accrued with right of entry, unless such * * *
trust shall have been acknowledged by writing to subsist by the party
to be charged thereon within the same period.' The.words 'with
right of entry,' at the end of the clause, I esteem as material to be
considered in construing it. The expression evidently means, I
think, if there be neither entry nor possession taken by the party
in whose favor the trust results, within five years after it accrues,
and no acknowledgment in writing, the trust cannot thereafter be
asserted in law against the trustee ;" see Best v. Campbell, 62
Penna. St. 478, for an application of this ruling. In Williard v.
Williard, 56 Penna. St. 124, it was held where possession has been
taken by the alleged cestui que trust under his title (the words of
the act being " * * * unless * * * there has been in part a sub-
stantial performance "), that if the act had begun to run, possession
taken would stop it; and if possession preceded the trust relation,
the statute would not begin to run; citing Clarke v. Trindle, 52
Penna. St. 492 (query, whether, however, possession existing prior
to a contract or trust can be regarded as part-performance to save
the transaction from the operation of the statute); Jones v. Peter-
man, 3 S. & R. 542; Farley v. Stokes, 1 Pars. Eq. Cas. 422 ;
Cravener v. Bowser, 4 Penna. St. 259; Aitkin v. Young, 12 Id.
15; Christy v. Barnhart, 14 Id. 260; Greenlee v. Greenlee, 22
Id. 237; Myers v. Byerly, 45 Id. 368; Workman v. Guthrie, 29
Id. 495; Browne on Statute of Frauds, § 477, et seq. See, how-
ever, as examples of cases where a prior possession continued after
the contract made was held under the circumstances to be part-per-
formance: Aurand v. Wilt, 9 Penna. St. 54, and Moss v. Culver,
64 Id. 424.
In Church v. Ruland, 64 Penna. St. 444, where A. received a
devise of land for life, subject to the trust that she should leave the
land to B. in her will, it was held that the limitation of the 6th
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section of the Act of 1856, did not run against B. till A.'s death:
.Price's Appeal, 54 Penna. St. 472, being cited.
8. .Equitable mortgages by the deposit of title-deeds.
These have never been recognised in Pennsylvania: ilickert v.
Madeira, 1 Rawle 325; Shitz v..Dffenbach, 3 Penna. St. 233;
Bowers v. Oyster, 3 Penna. R. (P. & W.) 239.
9. The liability of one who has irregularly endorsed a note, c.
An interesting question as to whether an irregular endorsement
is a good memorandum under the Statute of Frauds to hold the
endorser has been much considered in Pennsylvania. In Jack v.
Mortson, 48 Penna. St. 113, Judge WOODWARD, commending the
provisions of the Statute of Frauds as to guaranties, held that where
under a parol contract of guaranty, the defendant, the alleged guar-
antor, endorsed a note (which had been drawn to the plaintiff's
order and of which the plaintiff was first endorser), below the plain-
tiff's endorsement, he, the defendant, could not be held either under
the law merchant as an endorser nor under the parol guaranty
because of the Statute of Frauds, With which the pndorsement did
not comply as a proper memorandum. In Schaefer v. Bank, 59
Penna. St. 144, discussing the question and citing authorities, Judge
SHARSWOOD said that the court, warned by the many exceptions
which English decisions had made in the law of the Statute of
Frauds, were determined to uphold the Pennsylvania Act strictly
and therefore affirmed Jack v. Morrison. See Barto v. Schenck,
4 Casey 447, on this 4uestion. Jack v. Morrison was followed in
Slack v. .King, 67 Penna. St. 384, where the defendant had en-
dorsed above the endorsement of the person to whose order the note
was made; and in WiTson v. Martin, 74 Penna. St. 159, a case of
an endorsement on a non-negotiable note. See, in supporf of Jack
v. Morrison and Schaefer v. The Bank, Alter v. Longebartel, 5
Phila. 151, Murray v. McKee, 60 Penna. St. 85. In W-ilbert v.
Pinkbeiner, 68 Penna. St. 243, it was held that while Jack v. Mor-
rison held that before 1855 an irregular endorsement could be shown
by parol, cases being cited, to be intended to be a guaranty, so since
1855, the same end could be accomplished by writings properly
signed so as to comply with the Statute of Frauds. See upon this
subject Martin, v. 1Duffey, 4 Phila. 75; Robinson v. Rebel, 1
Weekly Notes (Phila.) 9 ; Fuller v. Scott, 8 Kans. 32 ; Underwood
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v. J7ussack, 38 Ill. 214; Hodglns v. Bond, 1 N. II. 284; Faur-
rell v. )Iorgan, 7 Minn. 868.
10. The statement in the memorandum under thLe Statute of
Frauds of the consideration of a contract.
As regards the great lWarn v. Wralters controversy it has been
held in Pennsylvania that the consideration need not be set out in
a memorandum under the Statute of Frauds; Paul v. Stackhouse,
38 Penna. St. 302; Bowser v. Cravener, 56 Id. 132.
11. The effect of the nature of the consideration in taking a
guarainty out of the Statute of F.rauds.
In the important discussion which has taken place upon the
question raised by Chane. KENT in Leonard v. Jrredenburg, 8 Johns.
29, viz., how far a new affirmative consideration passing to the pro-
misor will save a parol guaranty from the operation of the Statute
of Frauds, the courts of Pennsylvania have tqken a not unimpor-
tant part: see Naule v. Buckwell, 50 Penna. St. 39; Throop on
Val. of Verb. Agreem., § 615 et seq., 13 Am. Law Reg., N. S., p.
593. The view of Leonard v. T-redenburg, taking the affirmative
of the question, has certainly been denied; it is open, however, to
question how far Pennsylvania authority will sanction the proposi-
tion which was built upon the ruins of Chancellor KENT'S doctrine,
to the effect that where the guarantor has a leading purpose in view
in answering for the previous debt and does it for an object of his
own, to the accomplishment of which the guaranty proper is a mere
incident, his undertaking may, as a fact, be found to be an original
one.
In conclusion, it may be added that in AleKinney v. Snyder, 78
Penna. St. 49, Judge PAxsoN said, "That the practical working of
the recent Act of Assembly (1869) allowing the parties in a con-
troversy to be examined as witnesses on their own behalf, admonishes
us that it would be unwise to relax any of the rules of law arising
under the Statutes of Limitations and of Frauds and Perjuries."
HENRY REED.
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